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A COMMENT ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
JUDICIAL SALARY AND JUDICIAL QUALITY
STEPHEN MARKS*

Professor Scott Baker was kind enough to present his empirical research on
the relationship between judicial salary and judicial quality' to the Law and
Economics Workshop run by Professor Keith Hylton 2 and me last fall and Iam
honored to be able to comment on it today. It is part of a growing body of
literature in law that tries to shed light on important issues through statistical
analysis. Baker's paper, even before its publication, generated a significant
amount of buzz.
As Baker points out and as is well-known, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court has opined that low judicial pay threatens to undermine significantly the
quality of the judicial system. 3 This view, as Baker notes, has been "endorsed
by prominent law school deans, the American Bar Association, and leading
members of the corporate bar."'4 Baker's statistical analysis casts doubt upon
this thesis.
In this Reply I will first review the economic arguments underlying the
thesis that low salaries reduce the quality of the judiciary, as well as the
countervailing arguments. I will then look at Scott Baker's statistical analysis
and try to determine if this analysis provides evidence as to whether salary
affects the quality of the judiciary. I was impressed by the sophistication and
creativity of the statistical analysis in the face of formidable evidentiary
problems, e.g. how does one measure the effect of salary when all judges earn
the same amount and how does one measure judicial quality. I will note my
reservations about some of the assumptions underlying the statistical analysis
and highlight certain things that I might have done differently. Nevertheless,
Baker's work is a heroic effort carried out competently and creatively.
Whether it ultimately succeeds and overcomes the inherent evidentiary
Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.
The paper was ultimately published in the Boston University Law Review. Scott
Baker, Should We Pay FederalCircuitJudges More?, 88 B.U. L. REv. 63 (2008).
2 Paul J.Liacos Scholar in Law, Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.
I Chief Justice John G. Roberts, 2006 Year-End Report on the FederalJudiciary,39 THE
THIRD BRANCH: NEWSLETTER OF THE FEDERAL COURTS (Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts,
Wash. D.C.), Jan. 2007, at 1, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/jan06ttb/
yearend/index.html (predicting that if the difference between judges' and lawyers' pay

remains too large, "the judiciary will over time cease to be made up of a diverse group of
the Nation's very best lawyers.").
4 Baker, supra note 1, at 65.
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problems is a matter for the reader to decide. I will, however, try to shed some
light on the issue.
Using a traditional statistical approach, Baker takes as his null hypothesis
the proposition that current variations in judicial pay do not affect judicial
quality. He then asks: is there sufficient evidence to reject this hypothesis?
Baker does not find sufficient evidence. This result, as statisticians know,
could mean two things. It could mean that there is indeed no relationship
between salary and judicial quality, or it could mean that there is a relationship,
but the data is so poor that it simply cannot reveal the relationship. I will
discuss these issues below in greater detail.
My bottom line is that Baker's study provides mild support for his thesis
that increasing judicial salaries will not improve the judiciary.
THE THEORY AND SOME PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE

The evidence for the pernicious effect of low judicial salary is twofold.
First, distinguished lawyers receive significantly higher monetary
compensation than do distinguished judges.5 This fact, coupled with economic
theory, suggests that the best and brightest legal minds may go into lawyering
rather than judging. Second, those involved in the recruitment of judges report
that there are instances in which distinguished lawyers have declined offers of
6
judgeships due to the pay differential.
Economic theory suggests that higher pay will attract more candidates.
Higher pay will produce a candidate pool that is a superset of the pool that
would exist with lower pay. Put another way, higher pay attracts additional
candidates without losing those candidates who would be attracted to the job
even with lower pay.
Economic theory also suggests that candidates attracted by a higher salary
are better candidates. Suppose, for example, (1) that candidates are motivated
only by money and (2) that higher quality judicial candidates can command
higher lawyer salaries as well. Under these assumptions, high quality judicial
candidates will consider being judges only if the salary is commensurate with
the high salaries they would receive as lawyers. In this model, higher judicial
salaries will bring higher-qualified judges into the pool of judicial candidates.
If the selection from this pool is also based on quality, or even if judges are
picked randomly, then higher salaries should result in better judges. This
simple economic model underlies the claims that low judicial salaries, relative
to lawyer salaries, are threatening the quality of the judiciary. Under the

5 See, e.g., SALARIES OF FEDERAL JUDGES, ASSOCIATE JUSTICES, AND CHIEF JUSTICE SINCE

1968 1 (2007) (stating that in 2005, federal circuit judges received a salary of $171,800);
The AmLaw 100, 2006, AM. LAW., May 2006, at 165 (stating that in 2005, average partner
salaries at a top Chicago law firm exceeded $2 million).
6 See, e.g., Abner Mikva, Judicial Pay: Attracting the Best, NAT'L L.J. (June 4, 2007)
(cited in Frank Cross, Perhaps We Should Pay Federal Circuit Judges More, 88 B.U. L.
REv. 815 (2008)).
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assumptions of this model, if judges are offered only 60% of what top lawyers
make, then the inevitable result is an inferior judiciary. Of course, even with
this model, the magnitude of the effect is not clear. It could be that lawyers
who earn 60% of what top lawyers make would still make excellent judges. In
this model, the degree of the effect on quality depends on how rapidly quality
falls off as salary goes down.
Of course, people, including judges and lawyers, are not motivated by
money alone. It is possible, as Baker points out, that judging may provide nonpecuniary benefits relative to lawyering. 7 It may also be possible that the
qualities that make a good judge are not the same as those that make a highlypaid lawyer. Academia provides a good illustration of both these effects. All
of us know excellent law teachers and researchers who would not make it as
highly-paid lawyers because, although they possess skills that make them
excellent professors, they lack the skills that would make them highly-paid
lawyers. The opportunity costs of taking a professorship are low for these
people. We also know of excellent law teachers and researchers who could be
highly-paid lawyers, but prefer the life of a professor, even at a greatly reduced
salary. For these individuals, we say that the non-pecuniary benefits of being a
professor, plus the professor salary, provide greater utility than the combined
salary and non-pecuniary benefits of being a highly-paid lawyer. Thus, there
are two reasons to suspect that, even at a lower salary, we still end up with an
excellent set of professors. The same reasons apply to judges. Some excellent
judicial candidates may have relatively low-paying alternatives because, in
spite of having excellent judicial skills, they lack skills that would make them
highly-paid lawyers. Other excellent judicial candidates might have very
attractive alternatives as lawyers, but the non-pecuniary benefits of judging
outweigh the salary differences.
Scott Baker focuses on the non-pecuniary benefits of judging. He posits that
for some, judging confers large non-pecuniary benefits, inducing them to
accept lower-paying judicial appointments rather than higher-paying lawyer
positions. 8 But do people who receive large non-pecuniary benefits make good
judges? It could be that these non-pecuniary benefits are antithetical to good
judging. For example, non-pecuniary benefits might include the ability to
favor one's friends in important cases or to take large amounts of leisure time.
If so, then lower judicial salaries could result in worse judges. It could also be
that non-pecuniary benefits are unrelated to good judging. Perhaps some
people just enjoy the process of judging more than the process of lawyering.
This would mean that even with lower salaries, there could be excellent
judicial candidates. A third possibility is that non-pecuniary benefits are
actually positively related to good judging. Such benefits may include the
ability to serve the public, to be engaged intellectually, to preserve the rule of
7 See Baker, supra note 1,at 66.
8 See id.

at

73 (explaining that the non-pecuniary benefits of judging include "status,

prestige, leisure, power to affect policy, and public service").
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law, and so forth. In such a case, raising judicial salaries will increase the
proportion of those in the pool who are interested in judging only for the
money but who are unlikely to be better judges than those already in the pool.
The presence of non-pecuniary benefits thus complicates the picture and
makes it less obvious that lower judicial pay will result in worse judicial
candidates or that higher pay will produce better judicial candidates. It is
possible that a salary of $179,500, lifetime tenure, generous retirement
benefits, the attendant prestige, and a work day that is intellectually stimulating
are sufficient to draw into the applicant pool more than enough highly
qualified judges to fill all positions. Raising salaries may just increase this
surplus of qualified candidates, without increasing the quality of the judiciary
at all.
In short, it is an empirical question. Other professions have similar issues.
One might suspect, for example, that increasing professional major league
baseball salaries would not increase the quality of play. On the other hand, one
might suspect that an increase in the salaries of high school teachers would
increase teacher quality. Of course, it is not surprising that judges feel their
salaries should be higher. Nor is it surprising that there are stories about
potential judges declining appointments due to the salary differential. Whether
this will lead to worse judges, however, is unclear.
BAKER'S METHOD

In testing his hypothesis that salaries of circuit judges do not affect quality,
Baker faces two problems. First, the independent variable does not vary
because all circuit judges make the same amount of money. Second, the
quality of judging is difficult to ascertain, making the dependent variable
unobservable. Yet things may not be as hopeless as they appear. As for the
problem of uniform judicial salaries, Scott Baker observes that the judges'
salaries relative to lawyers' salaries have varied over time and across
geography. 9 Both judges' salaries and lawyers' salaries have changed over
time, but at different rates, causing the differential between them to change.
Additionally, while federal judges' salaries do not vary across geography, the
salaries of lawyers do, which means the differential varies as well. These
variations can be used to test whether the difference between lawyer and judge
salaries affects the quality of the judiciary.
Consider a hypothetical. Suppose that the country were divided into two
regions: the regions are identical except that in Region A, all prices and
salaries are double those in Region B. Now let us introduce the market for
judges. Suppose that judges are offered the same nominal salary in both
regions.
The following table gives a numerical example with these
assumptions:

9 See id. at 76-77.
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(A) Cost of Living Index' °
(B) Lawyer Salaries
(C) Lawyer Salaries Adjusted for Cost of
Living
(D) Judge Salaries
(E) Judge Salaries Adjusted for Cost of
Living
(F) Net cost of becoming a judge (C) - (E)

Region A
2
400,000
200,000

Region B
1
200,000
200,000

150,000
75,000

150,000
150,000

125,000

50,000

Judges in Region A are effectively making half of what judges in Region B
are making. In such a case, we would expect the applicant pool in Region B to
be larger than the applicant pool in Region A. Provided that we had good
measures of quality, we could test whether the quality of appointed judges was
better in Region B.
Note that if judges are not mobile then judges are drawn from regional
pools. The pool for Region B is bigger than that for Region A. If judges are
completely mobile, then both regions would draw from a national pool of
judges. The national pool available to Region A, however, would be a subset
of the pool available to Region B. Thus, in this story, judicial mobility does
not impede the analysis." However, mobility will affect the analysis, as we
will see below.
SOME RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE METHODOLOGY

Calculationof Real Lawyer Salaries
In order for the analysis to work, real judicial salaries must be compared to
real lawyer salaries. The notion is to compare what a judge makes to what the
judge could have made as a lawyer. What a judge earns is simply the nominal
salary that the judge actually receives, discounted for cost-of-living and
inflation. But what about the foregone lawyer salary? Which geographical
legal market serves as a benchmark for potential lawyer salary depends on the
Consider the following modified
assumptions about judicial mobility.
example:
10 This measure represents the cost of living in nominal dollars. In our example, it takes
twice as many nominal dollars in Region A to purchase the same basket of goods as in
Region B.
" I point this out because some critics of Baker's approach seem to believe Baker's
analysis assumes judicial immobility. For example, Frank Cross, in a reply to Baker's
article, states that many judges are in fact mobile, and that even within the regions that
Baker uses, there exist large salary disparities. Frank Cross, Perhaps We Should Pay
Federal CircuitJudges More, 88 B.U. L. REv. 815 (2008) (pointing out that "a good number
of circuit court judges have relocated" and that the South Atlantic region used in Baker's
Judge Sprouse example encompasses sub-regions with greatly differing salary norms).
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(A) Cost of Living Index
(B) Lawyer Salaries
(C) Lawyer Salaries Adjusted for Cost
of Living
(D) Judge Salaries
(E) Judge Salaries Adjusted for Cost of
Living
(F) Net cost of becoming a judge (no
mobility)
(G) Net cost of becoming a judge
(mobility)
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Region A
2
400,000
200,000

Region B
1
350,000
350,000

150,000
75,000

150,000
150,000

125,000

200,000

275,000

200,000
I

Rows (F) and (G) represent the cost of becoming a judge in the two regions
under the assumptions of no mobility and mobility, respectively. If there is no
mobility between regions - which assumes that judges are appointed in the
regions in which they reside - then we should calculate the lawyer salary
within the region. In our example, the net cost of becoming a judge would
then be higher in Region B. Based on Baker's non-pecuniary analysis, a judge
in Region A would need the equivalent of $125,000 in non-pecuniary benefits
to become a judge, while a judge in Region B would need $200,000 in nonpecuniary benefits. On the other hand, if there is complete mobility, a
candidate considering an appointment in Region A would compare the real
lawyer salary in Region B versus the judicial salary in Region A. Thus, a
candidate considering a judicial appointment in Region A would require
$275,000 in non-pecuniary benefits. A judge considering an appointment in
Region B would require $200,000 in non-pecuniary benefits.
Note that the mobility assumption completely affects the net cost of
becoming a judge. Under the "salary matters" hypothesis' 2 and the assumption
of immobility, we would expect better judges in Region A. Under the "salary
matters" hypothesis and the assumption of mobility, we would expect better
judges in Region B. Thus, the mobility assumption has a critical effect on the
analysis. Which is the better assumption? It would seem that if a judge has
moved from her place of origin to a new place to judge, then the mobility
assumption would be reasonable. In that case, the sacrificed lawyer salary
should be that of the highest paying area, in real terms. Baker uses real lawyer
salaries from the place of origin. This assumes no mobility, even when the
judge demonstrated mobility by moving. The effect of getting this assumption
wrong is to throw randomness into the calculation of the opportunity costs of
judging. This, in turn, increases the likelihood that the coefficients will show

12Baker, supra note 1, at 74 ("Under the 'salary matters' theory, increased competition

affects the kind of person eventually selected for the bench.").
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statistical insignificance, even if there is in fact a relationship between
opportunity costs and judicial quality.
Cumulation Under the Direct Comparison Approach
Scott Baker utilizes two different methodologies to examine the relationship
between judicial compensation and judicial quality. The first methodology,
which he calls the "direct comparison approach," looks at the amount each
judge gives up over his or her career to be a judge.' 3 It assumes that those who
become judges earlier in life give up more than those who become judges later,
simply because the salary differential operates for a greater number of years.
Unfortunately, cumulating the salary differential in this way is not, in my
opinion, justified theoretically and has the effect of introducing unnecessary
randomness into the independent variable. This randomness could easily mask
any relationship between salary and quality that may exist under the "salary
matters" hypothesis.
To see why this is the case, consider two hypothetical judges. Judge
Younger serves for two periods, while Judge Older serves for one. Each judge
receives some non-pecuniary benefit for being a judge as opposed to being a
lawyer. Let us speculate that this non-pecuniary benefit comes from not
having to work as hard. Specifically, each judge works five hours fewer per
week than he or she would as a lawyer. The result of working fewer hours is
that opinions take longer to write. In this model, taking longer to write an
opinion is the sign of a less hardworking and thus a lower quality judge.
Suppose that the value of this extra leisure is worth $150,000 a year. Now
suppose that judicial pay for both judges is $175,000 and that each could earn
$300,000 a year as a lawyer:
Judge Younger
Potential Lawyer Pay: $300,000
Judge Pay: $175,000
Amount of Leisure if Judge: 5 hours a week
Value of Leisure: $150,000 per year
Judge Older
Potential Lawyer Pay: $300,000
Judge Pay: $175,000
Amount of Leisure if Judge: 5 hours a week
Value of Leisure: $150,000 per year
Both prefer to be judges rather than lawyers despite the decrease in pay
because of the non-pecuniary benefits of judging relative to lawyering. Each
takes the same amount of leisure and each produces opinions at the same
speed. Because these judges are identical, except for length of service, we
"3

See id. at 77-83.
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really cannot use them to test the "salary matters" hypothesis. Yet under
Baker's methodology, finding identical results for these two judges is used as
evidence against the "salary matters" hypothesis. This is because Baker
cumulates the pecuniary losses over time. Since Judge Younger serves for two
periods, her losses are $250,000. Judge Older's losses are only $125,000.
Thus, Baker's methodology treats Judge Younger as if she had a salary
significantly less than that of Judge Older. If the time to produce an opinion is
identical for both judges, then , in Baker's methodology, it is evidence against
the "salary matters" thesis. This does not seem right - after all, the salaries per
period are identical and one would not expect the data on quality to tell us
anything. Consider another example:
Judge Younger
Potential Lawyer Pay: $270,000
Judge Pay: $175,000
Amount of Leisure as Judge: 4 hours a week
Value of Leisure: $120,000 per year
Judge Older
Potential Lawyer Pay: $300,000
Judge Pay: $175,000
Amount of Leisure as Judge: 5 hours a week
Value of Leisure: $150,000 per year
In this case, Judge Younger is getting a higher salary relative to lawyering
than Judge Older. The "salary matters" thesis would predict that, because
Judge Younger is making more money relative to being a lawyer, she should
be a harder-working judge. And indeed she is, as evidenced by the fact she has
less leisure time than Judge Older. However, Baker's methodology treats
Judge Younger as if she is making less money than Judge Older - she loses
$240,000 while Judge Older only loses $150,000 - because Baker cumulates
the salary differential over time. The fact that Judge Younger is harder
working is treated as evidence against the "salary matters" thesis.
One can come up with many different examples. Sometimes cumulation
amplifies the differences in single-period salary and sometimes it diminishes or
even reverses the differences. In general, cumulating losses over time creates
meaningless variation in the NETCOST variable - the measure of the
pecuniary loss in taking a job as a judge relative to taking a job as a lawyer and will likely mask any causal effects between NETCOST and measures of
quality. That is, even if the "salary matters" thesis were true, the unrelated
variation in the NETCOST variable from cumulation would likely mask the
relationship between salary and judicial quality.
All is not lost, however. Baker also applies a pool approach to test the
"salary matters" hypothesis. The "pool approach" forms a measure of the
strength of the pool of judicial candidates at the time of a judge's
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appointment.' 4 The pool measure is the salary differential of a typical 49-yearold candidate at the time of the appointment and in the geographical area of the
appointment.15 As with the direct comparison approach, pecuniary losses from
judging are cumulated over time. However, the cumulation period is uniform
(sixteen years) and, as a result, there is a 0.98 correlation between the
Thus, the
cumulated net cost and the single period net cost. 16
NETCOSTPOOL variable can be taken as a near perfect proxy for single
period differentials between lawyer salary and judge salary. Because this
measure does not suffer from the problem of randomness generated by
nonuniform cumulation, one might expect that it would better test the "salary
matters" hypothesis.
Measures of Quality
Even if we had a well-defined and theoretically justified measure of judicial
salary, such a study still requires measures of judicial quality. The thesis that
"salary matters" is really a thesis that low judicial pay is compromising judicial
quality. Baker uses the following proxies for judicial quality:
1. Ideological voting. Better judges are less likely to vote ideologically
in controversial cases, where voting ideologically is voting in line with
the ideology of the President and Senators involved in the judge's
nomination. "
2. Ideologicalciting. Better judges are more likely to cite the opinions of
judges with contrary ideologies. ' 8
3. Dissents. Better judges are likely to dissent more. 19
4. Opinion writing. Better judges are likely to write their opinions more
20
quickly.
14 Id.

at 83-84 (addressing the "salary matters" argument that higher salaries would

create a deeper - and better - pool of judgeship candidates).
15 Id.
16 This correlation was calculated from the data that Baker was kind enough to provide to

his commenters.
17 See id. at 85 ("The operative assumption is that a more ideological judiciary will
engage in more partisan voting patterns in [controversial] cases.").
18Id. at 85-86, 95-96 ("Under this measure, a more ideological judiciary consists of

judges who seldom, if ever, recognize the opinions of judges from the other political party

as persuasive authority."); see also Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Ranking Judges
According to Citation Bias (as a Means To Reduce Bias), 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1279,
1281-82 (2007) (hypothesizing that ideologically motivated judges tend not to cite authority

from other circuits when it was written by judges of a different political party).
'9 See Baker, supra note 1, at 98-99 (explaining how dissenting has both temporal and
social costs, and thus can be a measure of how hard a judge is willing to work).
20 See id. at 101-03 (measuring the speed of case disposition in controversial cases that
have advanced past the oral argument stage).
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5. Influence. Better judges do not try to be influential. 2 1
The notion is as follows: lower pay results in judges who receive higher
non-pecuniary benefits for judging. These non-pecuniary benefits could lead
to negative results in the judiciary: more ideological judging, fewer
hardworking judges, or judges who value being influential. More ideological
judging is evidenced by ideologically consistent voting and citing. Fewer
hardworking judges is evidenced by a longer time to write opinions and fewer
dissents. Influence mongering is evidenced by the production of opinions that
are cited more often.
Of course, non-pecuniary benefits could also result in better judging.
Positive non-pecuniary benefits would perhaps include the enjoyment of
intellectual challenges, a desire to engage in public service, and so forth. This
casts some doubt upon the proxies used by Baker. For example, a more
diligent, careful, and intelligent judge may take longer to write opinions and
may also produce better opinions, which are likely to be cited more often. So
arguably, two of the proxies used by Baker as evidence of bad judging could
also signify good judging. It also is not clear that better judges dissent more
often. Good judges may seek consensus and be more willing to compromise.
Of course, since Baker finds the relationship between salary and any of
these variables to be either statistically or economically insignificant, it is
perhaps not as important to interpret whether they mean good judging or bad
judging. Still, if we are trying to test a hypothesis about good judging, it is
important that the proxies are strongly correlated with the quality of judging.
If they are not strongly correlated, then the results of the statistical analysis,
whether significant or not, will not say much about the relationship between
salary and the quality of judging.
And here is a scary thought: suppose what we are really testing for is the
mere presence of non-pecuniary benefit. That is, suppose that the null
hypothesis is that judges do not receive any non-pecuniary benefit from
judging relative to lawyering. In that case, statistically or economically
insignificant results would support the null hypothesis and we might conclude
that judges are not motivated by any non-pecuniary benefits. The only
remaining explanation is that those who become judges do so only because
they have no other attractive alternatives. If judging skills and lawyering skills
are at all correlated, then this would support the "salary matters" thesis.
Other Quibbles
Scott Baker has ably anticipated other objections. Some of these objections
are more serious than others. For example, it does not bother me that the
NETCOST data are not judge-specific, especially since I believe that the pool
approach is the better one in any case. 22 I do worry about the multicollinearity
21 See id. at 105-07 (addressing the "salary matters" argument that lower judicial salaries
result in more judges who crave influence).
22 See id. at 109-10.
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that is generated by including circuit dummies. Baker points out that
multicollinearity does not bias the results, and this is correct.23 However, since
a number of circuit dummies were statistically significant, I wonder if the
NETCOST coefficient would be statistically significant if these dummies were
removed. Multicollinearity caused by including the age variable should not be
much of an issue in the pooled approach.
CONCLUDING REMARKS

As I indicated above, there are a number of things I might have done
differently. I suspect, however, that the methodological changes that I would
implement would not drastically change the results. First of all, I suspect that
Baker's null hypothesis is true - that a salary of $179,500, lifetime tenure,
generous retirement benefits, the attendant prestige, and a workday that is
intellectually stimulating is sufficient to draw into the applicant pool enough
very highly qualified judges to fill all the positions and more. However, I also
suspect that even if it were not true, and salary did matter, it would be very
difficult to prove. As Baker points out, the data contain certain inherent
limitations. The very imperfect measures of judge quality in particular make
the analysis difficult. Nevertheless, there is enough here, in my mind, to at
least nudge one in the direction of the camp that holds increasing judicial
salary will not likely bring forth a better judiciary. 24 Whether it is enough to
move anyone from one camp to another I cannot say. What is clear is that this
study is creative, thoughtful, and meticulous. It squeezes more from the data
than I would originally have thought possible. It was a pleasure to read and
contemplate.

23 Id.

24 Bayesian analysis suggests that if there is even a small probability that the analysis
could uncover a relationship between salary and judicial quality, the failure to find such a
relationship should cause some revising of prior beliefs. For a brief description of Bayes'
Theorem,
Bayes'
of
Philosophy,
Encyclopedia
see
Stanford
Theorem,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bayes-theoreml (last visited Apr. 27, 2008).
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